## **Remuneration Report**

# Remuneration Report in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act

The remuneration report, prepared jointly by the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of GRAMMER AG in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), describes the basic features of the remuneration system for both the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board. The remuneration report provides information on the remuneration awarded and due to current and former members of the Executive Board and Supervisory Board in the fiscal year 2022 in accordance with the remuneration system applicable for the fiscal year 2022. The report takes into account the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) in the version dated April 28, 2022 (published in the German Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) on June 27, 2022).

In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, Ernst & Young Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft has formally audited the remuneration report. The remuneration report and the note regarding the audit are published on the website of GRAMMER AG (www. grammer.com).

On June 4, 2024 the remuneration report is to be submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval in accordance with the requirements of Section 120a (4) AktG.

The Executive Board and Supervisory Board of GRAMMER AG submitted the remuneration report for fiscal year 2022 prepared in accordance with section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to the Annual General Meeting on May 10, 2023 for resolution. It has been approved with a 99.97% approval rate. The Executive Board and Supervisory Board of GRAMMER AG regard this high approval rate as a clear confirmation of the form and content of the remuneration report and will therefore maintain the previous structure when preparing the remuneration report for fiscal year 2023.

#### 1. Review of the fiscal year 2023

Despite the once again challenging economic environment in fiscal year 2023, in particular influenced by the ongoing war in Ukraine as well as an albeit easing but nonetheless still high level of inflation, the GRAMMER Group was able to report a positive sales development and a revenue increase of EUR 2,304.9 million. The consolidated earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) also developed positively and increased significantly to EUR 42 million. The operating EBIT also improved significantly to EUR 56.8 million on a year-on-year basis. The year-on-year increase in earnings is primarily due to the more stable business performance in APAC and the positive development in EMEA. However, higher costs in the fourth quarter in particular as a result of volatile plant capacity utilization, currency exchange losses, and a continued sharp rise in personnel costs meant that the forecast of around EUR 70 million in earnings made at the beginning of the financial year could not be achieved and the earnings development was therefore ultimately below expectations. In response, GRAMMER initiated a program of measures aimed at increasing efficiency.

In fiscal year 2023 Mr. Horst Ott, deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board, resigned from his role as Member of the Supervisory Board effective September 30, 2023. Effective October 1, 2023 the Amtsgericht Amberg appointed Mr. Udo Fechtner to the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board elected Mr. Fechtner as deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board with effect from October 1, 2023.

Effective January 1, 2023 the Supervisory Board resolved to adjust the target remuneration of Executive Board members Jens Öhlenschläger and Jurate Keblyte. With the appointments of Jens Öhlenschläger as CEO/Spokesperson and Jurate Keblyte as Labor Director the scope of their roles and responsibilities were significantly expanded. In light of the expanded scope of their roles and responsibilities as well as the continued positive performance and development of GRAMMER AG despite the once again challenging overall economic environment the Supervisory Board determined an increase in the target remuneration to be appropriate. With the adjustment of the target remuneration the Supervisory Board ensures that the remuneration of the Executive Board remains competitive in the long term in order to attract and retain the best and most suitable candidates as members Executive Board.

## 2. Overview of the Remuneration system of the Executive Board

### 2.1 Principles

On June 23, 2021 the current remuneration system for the members of the Executive Board of GRAMMER AG was approved by the Annual General Meeting with an approval rate of 99.89% and has been in place since the fiscal year 2021 for all active members of the Executive Board.

The remuneration system adopts a clear pay-for-performance approach, setting ambitious targets that are aligned with the corporate strategy. In addition, the remuneration system is more closely oriented to the capital market by offering a revised Longterm incentive in the form of a performance share plan. Among other things, the Short-term incentive includes ESG objectives, i.e. environmental aspects, social objectives, and responsible corporate governance, in order to provide an incentive for sustainable and responsible development at GRAMMER AG.

The principles of the new remuneration system are explained below.

## 2.2 Remuneration elements

The remuneration system of the Executive Board of GRAMMER AG consists of both fixed and variable components. In this context, a high proportion of the remuneration is performance-related. The variable remuneration components comprise a Shortterm incentive (STI) and a Long-term incentive (LTI). The table below shows the main principles of the remuneration system.

## **Fixed components**

Fixed remuneration Contractually agreed fixed remuneration paid in twelve equal monthly installm						
Ancillary benefits	Standard ancillary benefits (including company car and insurance cover)					
Retirement benefits	Cash amount that can be used by the member of the Executive Board for private pension savings					

## Variable components

Short-term incentive (STI)	
Plan type	Annual target bonus plan
Сар	170% of the target amount
Performance criteria	<ul> <li>Net income, EBIT or EBT (determined annually by the Supervisory Board)</li> <li>Free cash flow (FCF)</li> <li>Strategic and ESG goals, e.g. compliance, environmental protection, economic stability and growth</li> </ul>
Payment	In cash after the end of the financial year
Long-term incentive (LTI)	
Plan type	Performance share plan
Сар	200% of the target amount
Performance criteria	<ul><li>Total shareholder return (TSR) relative to the SDAX</li><li>ROCE</li></ul>
Performance period	Four years
Payment	In cash after four-year performance period
Further contractual provisions	i de la constante de la constant
Maximum remuneration	<ul> <li>EUR 2,700,000 for the Chairman of the Executive Board</li> <li>EUR 1,800,000 for the other members of the Executive Board</li> </ul>
Penalty/claw-back	Possibility of reducing or reclaiming performance-related remuneration in the event of serious breaches of duty or misstatements in the consolidated financial statements
Cap on terminations benefits	Termination benefits may not exceed the value of two years' total remuneration

#### **Fixed remuneration**


The fixed remuneration is paid in twelve equal monthly installments at the end of each month. The members of the Executive Board do not receive any separate remuneration for accepting intra-Group mandates.

#### Benefits in kind

The members of the Executive Board are granted customary ancillary benefits such as insurance benefits in line with market practice as well as a company car.

#### Pension substitute payment

Pension substitute payments are granted to the members of the Executive Board. This cash amount will be paid in December and can be used for private retirement provisions. A company financed pension plan does not exist.



#### Short-term incentive

The Short-term incentive is structured as a target bonus system and includes financial, strategic, and ESG targets. The financial performance criteria are derived directly from the corporate strategy and thus take into account the company's profitability and liquidity. In addition, the strategic and ESG objectives are intended to ensure the sustainability of the company's development.

The Short-term incentive (STI) 2023 complies with the remuneration system of GRAMMER AG, approved by the Annual General Meeting, and is described in the graphic below: The Supervisory Board set EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) and Free Cash Flow, each as a percentage of sales, as financial performance criteria for the STI and determined the individual weightings for the fiscal year 2023. Thus, the Supervisory Board considers profitability and liquidity of GRAMMER AG and supports the implementation of the corporate strategy through the use of these core performance indicators.

EBIT as a percentage of sales (50%) and Free Cash Flow (30%) are weighted at 80% of the total.

For strategic and ESG objectives the reduction of global CO2-emissions in terms of annual sales, the reduction of accident frequency (LTIFR = Lost time incident frequency rate), continuation of a structured talent management process as well as succession planning taking into account a medium-term diversity target rate. Those strategic and ESG criteria were selected by the Supervisory Board from a catalog of criteria derived from the materiality analysis of sustainability reporting. Strategic and ESG targets are weighted at 20%. The individual targets were equally weighted at 6.7%.

For all performance criteria, a target achievement between 0% and 200% can be achieved. Target achievements at intermediate values are interpolated linearly.

The following table shows target achievements and objectives for every performance criteria which is part of the Short Term Incentive for the fiscal year 2023:

#### STI 2023

	Weighting	Lower threshold	Target value	Upper threshold	Actual value	Target achievement
Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)						
(EBIT as % of revenue)	50%	1.90%	3.17%	3.96%	1.80%	0%
Free Cash Flow as % of revenue	30%	1.42%	2.36%	2.95%	2.10%	72%
			-5% compared to	–10% compared to		
Reduction of global CO <sub>2</sub> emissions		Previous year's	previous year's	previous year's		
in terms of revenue	6.7%	value (45g)	value (43g)	value (40g)	24g	200%
			–10% compared to	-20% compared to		
Reduction of accident frequency		200% target	the 200% target	the 200% target		
(LTIFR)	6.7%	from 2022 (5.0)	from 2022 (4.5)	from 2022 (4.0)	2.27	200%
Continuation of a structured talent			Qualitativo appopamento	f the outparty is any board		
management process	6.7%		Qualitative assessment o			128%
Total target achievement	100%					57%


The basis for STI payments is the STI target amount specified in the service contracts, which is multiplied by overall target achievement of the financial, strategic, and ESG performance criteria. The STI payment is made in cash and capped at 170% of the STI target amount. This results in the following target and payout amounts for the 2023 short term incentive:

### Target and payout amounts STI 2023

	Target value in EUR k	Target achieve- ment in %	Payout in EUR k
Jens Öhlenschläger	276	57	157
Jurate Keblyte	253	57	144

#### Long-term incentive - Performance Share Plan

The Long-term incentive (LTI) 2023 is structured as a Performance Share Plan and corresponds to the remuneration system of GRAMMER AG approved by the Annual General Meeting.



With a performance period of four years, the LTI is geared towards the long-term development of GRAMMER AG and, through its orientation to the share price, provides an incentive for achieving continuous growth in enterprise value. By additionally taking into account the Company's share performance relative to the SDAX, the interests of the Executive Board and shareholders are further aligned and GRAMMER AG's competitiveness in the capital market enhanced.

Under the performance share plan, a number of virtual shares are contingently allocated at the beginning of the performance period. The number of virtual shares is determined by dividing the LTI target by the arithmetic mean of the closing prices for the GRAMMER AG share over the last 60 trading days before the start of the performance period (initial reference price). For the performance share plan 2023 the following allocations of virtual shares were made:

#### LTI tranche 2023 allocations

	Target value in EUR k	Initial reference price in EUR	Number of virtual shares
Jens Öhlenschläger	444	10.06	44,135
Jurate Keblyte	407	10.06	40,457

In addition to the virtual share's performance target achievement is determined by the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and the relative total shareholder return (TSR).

ROCE is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) reported for the applicable financial year to average operating assets in the same financial year, expressed as a percentage. ROCE provides an incentive for maximizing the long-term profitability and efficiency of GRAMMER AG's business activities. It is measured as an average over the performance period. For ROCE, the target for each LTI tranche is derived from the long-term forecast.

The relative total shareholder return (TSR) is based on GRAMMER AG's share performance as well as (notionally) reinvested dividends in comparison with the SDAX and thus places a particular focus on the development of the Company's enterprise value as well as its capital market orientation. This particularly strengthens the alignment between the interest of the Executive Board and those of the shareholders. For the performance share plan's 2023 tranche the following target achievements for ROCE and relative TSR have been agreed on:

#### LTI tranche 2023 targets

	Lower threshold	Target value	Upper threshold
	0%	100%	200%
ROCE	6.65%	11.65%	14.65%
Relative TSR	75%	95%	115%

The final number of virtual shares reached at the end of the performance period is multiplied by the arithmetic mean of the closing prices of the GRAMMER AG share during the last 60 trading days prior to the end of the performance period 2026 plus dividends paid per GRAMMER AG share during the performance period. The resulting payout amount is limited to 200% of the LTI target amount. Payout is in cash and will be described in the remuneration report in 2026.

In 2019 and 2020, the members of the Executive Board have been promised Long-Term Incentives in the form of a performance cash plan. The relative total shareholder return compared with the SDAX is also taken into account. Instead of ROCE GRAMMER Economic Value Added (EVA) is used. In March 2020, in view of the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the company, the members of the Executive Board waived the allocation of their 2020-2023 LTI tranche and the grants already allocated for the 2019-2022 LTI tranche. Hence, no remuneration awarded or due under the Long-Term Incentive is currently to be reported within the meaning of Section 162 AktG.

#### Malus and Clawback

The remuneration system includes malus and clawback provisions, which allow the Supervisory Board, in certain cases, to reduce variable remuneration components that have not yet been paid (malus) or reclaim variable remuneration components that have already been paid (clawback).

In the event of a significant breach of duty or a compliance violation on the part of a member of the Executive Board, the Supervisory Board may reduce the variable remuneration components (STI or LTI) in part or in full at its due discretion (malus). If variable remuneration components have already been paid, the Supervisory Board may also demand partial or full repayment of the variable remuneration amounts received in such cases (clawback).

If variable remuneration components are determined or paid on the basis of incorrect data, e.g. misstatements in the consolidated financial statements, the Supervisory Board may correct the determination or reclaim the remuneration components already paid.

This does not prejudice the Executive Board member's potential liability towards the Company for damages under Section 93 (2) AktG.

For fiscal year 2023, the Supervisory Board did not see any reason to make any reductions or claims for repayment against members of the Executive Board.

#### Termination of the service contract

In the event of the premature termination of the service contract with a member of the Executive Board other than for good cause, payments to members of the Executive Board may not exceed the value of two years' worth of total remuneration and may not exceed the total remuneration for the remaining term of the service contract. The total annual remuneration as defined above comprises the fixed remuneration, the STI, the LTI and the pension substitute payment. If the service contract is terminated for good cause for reasons for which the member of the Executive Board is responsible, no LTI payments are made to him or her.

In the event of incapacity due to illness or accident, the member of the Executive Board concerned receives fixed remuneration for a further nine months. If the member of the Executive Board is entitled to illness-related benefits from third parties (e.g. sick pay), the claims are reduced accordingly. In the event of protracted incapacity over more than six months, the target STI and LTI amounts are reduced on a time-prorated basis.

In the event of the death of a member of the Executive Board, the surviving dependents (spouse and dependent children) continue to receive fixed remuneration for the month of death (time-proportionate) as well as for a further period of six months starting at the end of the month of death as joint creditors.

In the event of premature termination of the service contract, any outstanding variable remuneration components attributable to the period up until the date of termination of the contract are paid on the basis of the originally agreed targets and performance criteria on the due dates specified above. There is no early payout.

All entitlement accruing under outstanding LTI tranches lapse without any remuneration if the service contract is terminated by the Company before the end of the performance period for good cause for which the member of the Executive Board concerned is responsible, his or her appointment is revoked due to gross breach of duty, or he or she steps down other than for good cause and without the Company's consent. Notwithstanding this, all outstanding LTI tranches are settled immediately at the agreed targets (100% target achievement) and paid to the member of the Executive Board or his or her heirs if the service contract lapses due to disability or the death of the member of the Executive Board.

# 2.3 Individual disclosure of the Executive Board remuneration

When determining the specific target total remuneration of the members of the Executive Board, the Supervisory Board ensures that it is commensurate with the duties and performance of the member of the Executive Board in question and the Company's situation and thus conforms to the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act and the recommendations of the GCGC. The target total remuneration is set at a level that ensures competitiveness in the market for highly qualified executives but does not exceed the customary remuneration in the absence of any special justification.

To ensure this, the Supervisory Board regularly reviews the target total remuneration of the members of the Executive Board of GRAMMER AG. External as well as internal comparisons are applied for this purpose: On the one hand, an external comparison is made with companies that are comparable in terms of size, country, and sector. Hence, the Supervisory Board performed a comparison with the companies listed on the SDAX.

In addition, an internal comparison is used to assess the remuneration structure within GRAMMER AG. For this purpose, the remuneration of the Executive Board is compared with the two highest pay scale groups and the non-pay scale employee remuneration, and the status quo of and changes in these ratios over time are analyzed. The target remunerations were increased for the members of the Executive Board Jurate Keblyte and Jens Öhlenschläger in the fixed and variable remuneration elements as of January 2023 in order to make the remuneration competitive in the long term. The total target remuneration for Jens Öhlenschläger was increased by 21% to reflect his appointment as CEO/Spokesperson. The remuneration for Jurate Keblyte was increased by 12% to appropriately reflect her new role as Labor Director. With the adjustment of the target remuneration, the Supervisory Board ensures that the remuneration of the Executive Board remains appropriate and competitive in the long term.

The following table presents the target remuneration for the fiscal year 2023 and the relative share of every remuneration component for the fiscal year 2022:

	Jens Öhlenschläger Spokesman of the Executive Board (CEO) Executive Board Member since January 1, 2019			Jur CFO/L Executiv since/			
	2023		2022	2023		2022	
	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k	in %	in %	in EUR k	
Fixed remuneration	488	35	390	449	35	390	
Benefits in kind	23	2	25	24	2	24	
Pension substitute payment	150	11	125	138	11	125	
Short-term variable remuneration	276	20	230	253	20	230	
Short-term incentive 2022	_	_	230	-	-	230	
Short-term incentive 2023	276	-	-	253	-	_	
Long-term variable remuneration	444	32	370	407	32	370	
Long-term incentive 2022–2025	-	-	370	-	-	370	
Long-term incentive 2023–2026	444	-	_	407	-	-	
Total remuneration	1,381	100	1,140	1,270	100	1,139	

#### Remuneration Awarded and Due

The following table shows the remuneration awarded and due individually for the fiscal year 2023 in accordance with Section 162 AktG (fixed remuneration, short-term incentive, long-term incentive, expenses for benefits) and their relative share. The term "remuneration awarded and due" describes remuneration

for which the underlying activity has been fully performed as of the end of fiscal year 2023.

In addition, the remuneration awarded and due in fiscal year 2022 is presented.

## Remuneration awarded and due for the fiscal year

	Spokesman of th Executiv	<b>Öhlenschläger</b> ne Executive Board (C re Board Member anuary 1, 2019	<b>Jur</b> CFO/L Executiv since A			
	2023		2022	2023		2022
	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k	in %	in %	in EUR k
Fixed remuneration	488	60	390	449	59	390
Benefits in kind	23	3	25	24	3	24
Pension substitute payment	150	18	125	138	18	125
Short-term variable remuneration	157	19	74	144	19	74
Short-term incentive 2022 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	74	-	-	74
Short-term incentive 2023	157	-	-	144	-	_
Long-term variable remuneration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Long-term incentive 2019 – 2022²	-	_	0	-	_	0
Long-term incentive 2020 – 2023 <sup>2</sup>	0	-		0	_	
Other		0	-		0	
Remuneration awarded and due in accordance with Section 162 AktG	818	100	614	754	100	613

1 It was agreed between the Supervisory Board and the members of the Executive Board in office on December 31, 2022 to pay out only half of the remuneration due under the STI 2022, which constitutes a waiver in the amount of 50%.

<sup>2</sup> In March 2020, the members of the Executive Board waived the previously allocated 2019-2022 LTI tranche and the allocation of their 2020-2023 LTI tranche in view of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the company.

#### Maximum remuneration

Appropriate remuneration for members of the Executive Board is ensured by two types of caps: Firstly, a maximum cap of 170% on the STI and 200% on the LTI relative to the respective target amount is set for the variable components.

Secondly, pursuant to Section 87a (1) sentence 2 No 1 AktG, the Supervisory Board has defined maximum remuneration which caps the total amount of remuneration paid out for a given financial year irrespective of the date payment. The maximum remuneration amounts to EUR 2,700,000 for the Chairman of

#### Maximum remuneration for fiscal year 2023

the Executive Board and EUR 1,800,000 for the other members of the Executive Board.

In fiscal year 2023, the total of the fixed remuneration, benefits in kind, retirement benefits, and the awarded shortterm incentive is EUR 818 thousand and EUR 754 thousand for Jens Öhlenschläger and Jurate Keblyte respectively. Even if the long-term incentive were to pay out at its maximum the total of all remuneration components would not exceed the maximum remuneration.

#### 3. Remuneration System for the Supervisory Board

For each full year of membership, each member of the Supervisory Board receives fixed remuneration that is paid after the end of the year in question. In addition, the members of the committees, with the exception of the Nominating Committee and the Presiding Committee, receive fixed remuneration for each full fiscal year of their membership of the respective committee. The members of the Supervisory Board receive a fixed attendance fee for each Supervisory Board meeting and for each committee meeting they attend in person. The attendance fee is not paid for participation in meetings of the Nominating Committee. Members of the Supervisory Board or a committee for only part of the fiscal year receive fixed remuneration on a pro rata basis. Remuneration is differentiated by function and is based on the recommendations of the GCGC. In addition, the Company shall reimburse the members of the Supervisory Board for expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, including any value-added tax payable on the remuneration and the reimbursement of expenses.

	<b>Jens Öhlenschläger</b> Spokesman of the Executive Board (CEO) Executive Board Member since January 1, 2019	<b>Jurate Keblyte</b> CFO/Labor Director Executive Board Member since August 1, 2019
	in EUR k	in EUR k
Fixed remuneration 2023	488	449
Benefits in kind 2023	23	24
Retirement benefits 2023	150	138
Short-term incentive 2023	157	144
Payout limit for the Performance Share Plan (2023–2026)	888	814
Maximum Value of the remuneration for the fiscal year 2023	1,706	1,568
Maximum remuneration Section 87a (1) sentence 2 No 1 AktG	1,800	1,800

#### REMUNERATION SYSTEM FOR THE SUPERVISORY BOARD



The following table presents the remuneration awarded and due individually for members of the Supervisory Board for the fiscal years 2023 and 2022 as well as their relative share of total remuneration.

## Supervisory Board remuneration

	2023							2022		
	Fixed remune			Total remuneration	Fixed remuner	ation <sup>1</sup>	Attendance fees		Total remuneration	
	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k	in %	in EUR k
Dr. Martin Kleinschmitt (ChSB)	99	82	21	18	120	57	80	14	20	71
Udo Fechtner (deputy ChSB / from October 1, 2023)	14	69	6	31	20	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Klaus Bauer	35	85	6	15	41	32	76	10	24	42
Andrea Elsner	45	82	10	18	55	42	74	15	26	57
Dr. Ping He	35	85	6	15	41	32	76	10	24	42
Martin Heiss	45	78	13	22	58	42	69	19	31	61
Peter Kern	35	85	6	15	41	32	76	10	24	42
Jürgen Kostanjevec	35	90	4	10	39	32	76	10	24	42
Dagmar Rehm	55	85	10	15	65	32	82	7	18	39
Gabriele Sons	45	82	10	18	55	39	68	18	32	57
Prof. Dr. Birgit Vogel-Heuser	45	83	9	17	54	35	76	11	24	46
Antje Wagner	45	82	10	18	55	42	78	12	22	54
Former Supervisory Board members										
Horst Ott (deputy ChSB / until September 30, 2023)	40	80	10	20	50	49	71	20	29	69

<sup>1</sup> The members of the Supervisory Board in office as of December 31, 2022 have waived 10% of the fixed remuneration to which they are entitled in accordance with section 20 (1) of the Articles of Association of GRAMMER AG (only fixed remuneration for Supervisory Board activities, no waiver of fixed remuneration for committee activities).

#### 4. Comparative presentation of remuneration and earnings development

The table below describes the development of the remuneration awarded and due of present and former members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board in accordance with Section 162 AktG, the development of the average employee remuneration, as well as the performance development of GRAMMER AG over the past two years.

The average personnel expenses (IFRS) on a full-time equivalent basis are used for employee remuneration. For this purpose, employees in Germany are taken into account.

Net income is used as the earnings indicator, as it is a key performance indicator and an indicator of the profitability of business activities. Net income also serves as a possible performance target in the STI.

## Comparative presentation

	0000	Change	Change	Change
				2021/2020 in %
818	614	33	6	23
754	613	23	6	32
_				
120	71	69	n/a	n/a
20	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
41	42	-2	14	164
55	57	-4	36	-2
41	42	-2	14	90
58	61	-5	33	0
41	42	-2	14	90
39	42	-7	14	90
65	39	67	n/a	n/a
55	57	-4	30	87
54	46	17	28	0
55	54	2	29	5
50	69	-27	6	-4
73	70	4	-1	2
3,414	-78,561	104	-12,261	101
-14,897	-56,316	74	-2,247	97
	754         120         20         41         55         41         58         41         58         41         55         41         55         41         55         55         55         55         50         73         3,414	in EUR k in EUR k 818 614 633 754 613 754 613 754 613 754 613 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71	2023 in EUR k2022 in EUR k2023/2022 in 9%818 $614$ $33$ 754 $613$ $23$ 754 $613$ $23$ 120 $71$ $69$ 20 $n/a$ $n/a$ 41 $42$ $-2$ 55 $57$ $-4$ 41 $42$ $-2$ 58 $61$ $-5$ 41 $42$ $-2$ 39 $42$ $-7$ $65$ $39$ $67$ 55 $57$ $-4$ 55 $57$ $-4$ $54$ $46$ $17$ $55$ $57$ $-4$ $55$ $57$ $-4$ $54$ $46$ $17$ $55$ $57$ $-4$ $73$ $70$ $4$ $73$ $70$ $4$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $